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We consider the supply of a public good based on a publicly owned facility. The
Government has a choice between provision in-house and privatizing the facility and
then outsourcing the production. In particular, we focus on corruption in the decision to
privatize and on its effect on social welfare when there is asymmetric information on
the public and private manager’s efﬁciency. Our analysis shows that a corrupt
Government, that chooses to privatize only in exchange for a bribe, makes a positive
selection on the private ﬁrm’s efﬁciency and, thus, may have a positive effect on social
welfare.
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Corruption is usually deﬁned as the use of public ofﬁce for private gains by bureaucrats or politicians. Economists have
always been interested in the effects of corruption on welfare and the literature on this subject is by now a large chapter of
public economics, as reviewed in Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003). A strand of this literature maintains that
some corruption might be desirable, by helping individuals and ﬁrms to reduce delay in administrative procedures and
efﬁciently solving queuing problems (see, for example, Lui, 1985). This is known as the ‘‘grease the wheel’’ hypothesis. The
opposite ‘‘sand in the wheel’’ hypothesis views corruption less positively (Murphy et al., 1993).
Empirically, the question whether corruption greases or sands the wheels of the economy is not settled: despite many
found a negative effect of corruption on important macroeconomic variables such as growth, GDP per capita, FDI and
others (as surveyed in Bardhan, 1997), recent results show that the economic effects are ambiguous (de Vaal and Ebben,
2011; Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005; Dong and Torgler, 2010; Everhart et al., 2009; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2010).
A special case for the study of corruption is the process of privatization. Privatization is often seen as a way to reduce
the opportunities for corruption and to enhance efﬁciency. The process of privatization itself, however, is an occasion for
public bureaucrats to collect bribes: ﬁrms may pay off ofﬁcials in order to inﬂuence the decision whether to sell state-
owned enterprises, at what price and to whom. Looking at the experiences of privatization in the East European countries,
Latin America and Asia in the last 25 years, one comes to the conclusion that bribery seems to be a common occurrence
(Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 2004; Lu et al., 2008). But should we be concerned? Does
corruption forfeit most of the advantages that privatization was intended for, as most think, or is it possible that corruption
plays the role of an efﬁcient allocation mechanism? This is the question that we address in this paper.
The issue has been raised before in the literature, although not in a formal model, and the conclusions are not univocal.
On the one hand, along with the tradition that corruption might be desirable, some think that bribery can reproduce the
efﬁciency consequences of a competitive bidding procedure: the most efﬁcient producer has the largest surplus, therefore
he can afford the largest bribe. However, even the proponents of such view recognize that the Coasian bargaining betweenVenice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
fax: þ39 041 234 9176.
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information, uncertainty (given the risk of being caught) and contract enforceability (Bardhan, 1997). On the other hand,
and this seems to be the prevailing view, most authors think that corruption is the source of large inefﬁciencies in the
process of privatization and that the necessity to pay a bribe plays the role of a barrier to entry (for example, Rose-
Ackerman, 1997, 1999).
The goal of this paper is to disclose one of the mechanisms through which corruption could play a positive role. We
provide a formal model of the effects of corruption in the decision to privatize and we use it to investigate the selection
properties of bribing in the presence of asymmetric information on the ﬁrms’ efﬁciency. Our analysis shows that a corrupt
Government, that chooses to privatize only in exchange for a bribe, has a positive effect on expected social welfare. This
result is achieved because the bribe asked by the public ofﬁcial plays the role of a positive selection device. Therefore, the
result holds despite the asymmetry of information; in fact, it holds because of it.
We consider a Government that wants to supply a public good and has a choice between provision in-house and
outsourcing. The latter is conditional on privatizing a facility necessary for the production of the good; think, for example,
to school education where the facility is the school building. Our starting point is a model, along the lines of Hart et al.
(1997), analyzing the trade-off between public and private provision (in terms of cost and quality of the good) in which we
introduce corruption in the privatization process: a corrupt politician chooses to privatize only when the private ﬁrm
agrees to pay a bribe asked on the basis of a take it or leave it offer. The public ofﬁcial, not knowing the efﬁciency of the
private ﬁrm, asks for an ‘‘average’’ bribe which turns out to be too high for low efﬁciency ﬁrms. Consequently, he privatizes
only when the efﬁciency of the ﬁrm is above average and in this way he raises the ex post average efﬁciency of the
privatized ﬁrm above the ex ante average.
There are few other contributions that analyze the consequences of corruption in the privatization process. In Bjorvatn
and Soreide (2005), differently from our model, the decision to privatize is given but the privatization price and the market
concentration after privatization are endogenous. The main result of the paper is that social welfare is lower the higher the
level of corruption, due to higher concentration. In their model the efﬁciency of the ﬁrm is not an issue. In Laffont and
Meleu (1999), instead, the choice to privatize is endogenous and it occurs when politicians can recoup the lost gains they
derived from the public ﬁrm with shares of the private one; this leads to a u-shaped relationship between the level of
corruption and privatization. In this paper the driving force is not corruption in the decision to privatize but corruption,
and the associated gains, before it.
Perhaps more similar in spirit to our paper are Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986, 1990). These papers look at the
relationship between corruption and procurement; in particular, they study a bribery game where ﬁrms compete to win a
Government contract and there is asymmetric information on the private ﬁrms’ cost of providing the good. Instead of
assuming that the public ofﬁcial makes a take-it-or-leave-it request for a bribe, as we do, they consider the case of multiple
ﬁrms bidding competitively their bribes. They show that there is an isomorphism between bribery and a competitive
bidding procedure such that both mechanisms lead to the ex post efﬁcient allocation. Of course, this is true as long as the
public ofﬁcial is only inﬂuenced by the size of the bribe. And problems may arise if bribes are forfeited so that even the
losers of the bribing game pay the cost of their bribe, as pointed out by Clark and Riis (2000).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the trade-off between public and
private provision without corruption and compares these two alternative regimes in terms of social welfare. Section 3
introduces corruption and studies its effects. Section 4 discusses the generality of the result. Finally, Section 5 concludes.2. Provision without corruption
We consider the choice by the Government to supply goods such as hospitals, school or prison services either in-house,
i.e. through public employees, or to contract them out to a private supplier. In this section we shall present a simple
benchmark model of the trade-offs between public and private provision without corruption, that is with a benevolent
politician whose payoff is equal to social welfare. Our model is a special case of Hart et al. (1997) 1 to which we refer for
detailed proofs and motivation.
The Government owns a facility (for example a school) that is necessary to provide a good. The difference between
public and private provision hinges on the residual control rights of this facility under the hypothesis that contracts are
incomplete. As argued in Shleifer (1998), this difference would disappear if complete contracts could be written.2.1. Private provision without corruption
If private provision is chosen, the facility needs to be privatized. The Government and a risk neutral private manager
can write a long-term contract specifying the prices PF of the facility and P0 of the public good. This basic version of the
good brings social beneﬁt B0 at cost C0, the latter to be borne by the private manager. For convenience let P0C0 ¼ 0: We
also assume that PF is small enough for privatization to occur.1 In particular, we consider the case bðeÞ ¼ de, cðeÞ ¼ s ﬃﬃep , b¼ 0, l¼ 1.
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ﬃﬃ
e
p
, where
s 2 ½0;1 is a measure of the manager’s cost reduction ability, but also decreases welfare by de, d 2 ½0;1, due to lower
quality. Therefore, e modiﬁes the basic version of the good in the direction of not only lower cost but also lower quality.
We assume that exerting effort costs the manager e: Social welfare as a function of the manager’s ability s and his effort
e is
W ¼ B0C0þs
ﬃﬃ
e
p dee:
Effort, costs and beneﬁts are not veriﬁable so they cannot be speciﬁed ex ante in the long-term contract. Since
privatization gives the manager residual controls, the manager can implement any cost reduction he wishes, without
Government’s approval. It follows that equilibrium effort under private provision, denoted by eP , is the solution to the
following maximization problem:
max
e
s
ﬃﬃ
e
p e:
By straightforward calculations we get that equilibrium effort is
eP ¼
s2
4
ð1Þ
and equilibrium welfare under private provision as a function of s2 is
WPðs2Þ ¼ B0C0þ
s2
4
ð1dÞ:
2.2. Public provision without corruption
Consider now public provision. We assume that the description of the good is part of a contract between the
Government and a risk neutral public employee and we now interpret P0 as the wage the latter receives for providing (the
basic version of) the good. Due to non-veriﬁability, e cannot be speciﬁed by this contract.
When provision is done in-house, the public employee cannot implement cost reductions without Government
approval because he does not have residual control rights on the facility; also, the cost reducing effort is embodied in the
public employee’s human capital, i.e. the Government cannot achieve cost reductions without the employee’s participa-
tion. Therefore the Government and the employee get engaged in a renegotiation of their initial contract.
We assume that the gains achievable through renegotiation are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. Since in
the absence of an agreement the basic good is produced, the employee’s payoff after renegotiation is given by
P0C0þ12ðs
ﬃﬃ
e
p deÞe;
this is the payoff the employee maximizes when choosing the level of effort. Therefore, equilibrium effort under public
provision, denoted by eG, is
eG ¼
s2
4ð2þdÞ2
ð2Þ
and equilibrium social welfare when the good is provided in-house is
WGðs2Þ ¼ B0C0þs2
dþ3
4ð2þdÞ2
:
2.3. Evaluation of ownership structures without corruption
In order to evaluate the efﬁciency of the two forms of provision we ﬁnd the efﬁcient cost reducing effort, denoted by en,
as the solution to the following problem:
max
e
B0C0þs
ﬃﬃ
e
p dee:
The unique solution is
en ¼ s
2
4ðdþ1Þ2
: ð3Þ
Comparing the ﬁrst best effort en with the two equilibrium efforts eP of Eq. (1) and eG of Eq. (2), we see that eGoenoeP;
thus, neither form of provision is ﬁrst-best efﬁcient. More precisely, on one hand enoeP because private provision gives
too strong incentives to introduce cost reducing innovations. A private manager does not care about the negative
externality that his effort has on social welfare; thus, his cost reducing effort is greater than the socially optimal one. On
the other hand, eGoen, i.e. the cost reducing effort under public provision is smaller than the ﬁrst best effort, because a
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little incentives to introduce cost reducing innovations.
Which form of provision is second-best efﬁcient depends on the value of the parameters s and d, i.e. on the relative
efﬁciency in cost reduction of the private manager with respect to the public employee and on the social costs of the cost
reducing effort.
In particular, when the two managers have the same s, the equation WPðsÞ ¼WGðsÞ determines a threshold value
d ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
1C0:4142 such that private provision is better than public for dod and, conversely, public provision is preferable
otherwise. In other words, when the two managers have the same cost reducing efﬁciency, private provision is preferable
if the social cost of effort, which is disregarded by a private manager, is not too large.
When, instead, the private and the public manager have different efﬁciencies in cost reductions, denoted respectively
by sP and sG, private provision is better than public if
s2G
s2P
o ð1dÞð2þdÞ
2
ðdþ3Þ :
Since the expression on the right is decreasing in d, as d increases the private manager needs higher and higher
efﬁciency, compared to the public employee, in order to compensate the negative externality of the cost reduction.3. Provision with corruption
We now introduce corruption. We assume that the choice whether to privatize the asset is taken by a corrupt politician
who asks the private manager a bribe on the basis of a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the manager refuses the offer, the good is
provided by a public manager; if, instead, the bribe is paid, the facility is sold for a price PF and provision is contracted out.
The politician has incomplete information on both the private manager’s and the public bureaucrat’s cost reducing
efﬁciency, that is on the pair ðsP ,sGÞ, where sP and sG are two independent random variables whose squared value s2P and
s2G are both uniformly distributed in ½0;1.
Let B be the bribe asked by the politician. An optimal choice of the private manager is to pay the bribe whenever the
latter is smaller than his proﬁt net of the price of the facility, i.e. when
s
ﬃﬃ
e
p ePFZB
and refuse to pay otherwise. In what follows we set PF¼0.2
By substituting the equilibrium level of effort eP of Eq. (1) in the proﬁt expression above, we get that only a private
manager whose s2P is greater than 4B pays the bribe.
By subgame perfection, the politician asks for a bribe Bn ¼ 18, where Bn maximizes his expected revenue given the
manager’s decision to pay the bribe
max
B
Z 1
4B
B ds2:
We conclude that when the choice to privatize is made by a corrupt self-interested politician, in equilibrium provision
is private for s2PZ12 and public otherwise.
In order to evaluate the consequences of corruption on social welfare we compute the ex ante expected social welfare
with corruption, that we denote byWC : When s2Po12 the private manager refuses to pay the bribe and provision is public;
therefore, with probability one-half social welfare is the expected value with respect to sG of WGðsGÞ: When, instead,
s2PZ12, the bribe is paid and the facility is privatized so that social welfare is equal to the expected value of WPðsPÞ
conditional on s2PZ12. It follows that
WC ¼
Z 1=2
0
Z 1
0
WGðs2GÞ ds2G ds2Pþ
Z 1
1=2
WPðs2PÞ ds2P :
Deﬁne the ex ante expected social welfare under public provision WG as
WG ¼
Z 1
0
WGðs2Þ ds2:
Then, we can write WC as
WC ¼
Z 1=2
0
WG ds2Pþ
Z 1
1=2
WPðs2PÞ ds2P :
We are now ready to compare expected welfare under the different regimes.2 The results for PF strictly positive are qualitatively similar, as long as PF is small, as explained later.
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In what follows we compare the expected social welfare in an economy where provision of the public good is always
privatized with that of an economy where the decision whether to privatize is taken by a corrupt politician.
Denote the expected social welfare under privatization by WP where
WP ¼
Z 1
0
WPðs2Þ ds2
and consider the difference WCWP which can be expressed as
WCWP ¼
Z 1=2
0
½WGWPðs2PÞ ds2P :
Notice that for s2PZ12 a corrupt politician succeeds to extort a bribe and provision is private. Therefore, the two regimes
only differ for s2Po12:
As stated in Proposition 1, it turns out that corruption always leads to higher expected social surplus than private provision.
Proposition 1. For any value of d, WCZWP .
Proof. Deﬁne s^2 such that WPðs^2Þ WG. Then
s^2 ¼ dþ3
2ð1dÞð2þdÞ2
:
Therefore s^2 is an increasing function of d and it takes value 38 for d¼ 0: We consider two cases.First case:3 The origin
4 The fact th
5 See the didod. In this case WPð0Þ ¼ 0oWGoWP ¼WPð12Þ: Since WPðs2Þ is continuous and strictly increasing in s2,
it follows that s^2o12:
Write the difference WCWP as the sum of two elements:
WCWP ¼
Z s^2
0
½WGWPðs2PÞ ds2Pþ
Z 1=2
s^2
½WGWPðs2PÞ ds2P :
Notice that the ﬁrst integral is positive and the second is negative; therefore, in order for WCWP to be
positive, we need the ﬁrst element to be larger (in absolute value) than the second. Since WPðs2PÞ is a linear
function of s2P , this occurs for s^
2414: But this follows easily, because s^
2 is an increasing function of d and
s^2ð0Þ ¼ 38:
Second case: d4d. We now haveWPrWG and, as before,WPðs2Þ is continuous and increasing. ThusWPðs2ÞoWG for any
s2o12: It follows that
WCWP ¼
Z 1=2
0
½WGWPðs2Þ ds240: &According to Proposition 1, expected social welfare is larger when a self-interested corrupt politician decides whether
to privatize or not than under privatization; this is true regardless of the value of d, a measure of the social cost of effort.Fig. 1, which is drawn for d¼ 0,3 illustrates Proposition 1. The picture shows the areas corresponding to expected social
welfare for the two regimes: the gray shaded area represents corruption while the striped area corresponds to
privatization; as we already know, the two completely overlap for s2 greater than 12.
To get an intuition of why the result holds notice that when the efﬁciency s of the private manager is low, two things
happen: ﬁrst, privatization leads to low social welfare and, second, a corrupt politician asks for a bribe too high for a low
efﬁciency manager to pay. Therefore, corruption produces a positive selection effect that leads to privatize only when the
efﬁciency of the private manager is higher than the average public bureaucrat’s. This positive selection effect is what
makes corruption preferable to privatization from the point of view of social welfare.
Notice that a similar positive selection effect could also be obtained without the bribe by asking a strictly positive price
PF40 for the facility. In this model, in fact, the bribe B and the price of the facility PF have the same nature since they are
both prices paid by the private manager.4
Therefore, if PF was strictly positive, total welfare in case of privatization would be higher than the value WP we
computed above. However, even so, for PF small there might be space for a corrupt politician to make the private manager
pay a bribe in addition to the price PF and such a bribe would make a further positive selection (above the one obtained
through PF) that might be beneﬁcial in terms of welfare.
5 This is why the result we obtained is robust with respect to the
price of the facility, as long as PF is not too large.of the axis is ð0,B0C0Þ. Notice that the picture would be qualitatively similar for any value of dod , whereas for d4d we haveWP ð12ÞoWG.
at they differ in the person cashing has no consequences on total welfare.
scussion in Section 4 on what makes the positive selection of the bribe beneﬁcial when PF is positive.
WWP(2)
10.5
WG
2
Fig. 1. Expected social welfare under corruption and privatization.
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We now turn to the comparison of provision under corruption versus public provision. Write the differenceWCWG as
WCWG ¼
Z 1
1=2
½WPðs2PÞWG ds2:
Notice that now the two regimes lead to the same expected social welfare for s2o12 because in this range the
private manager refuses to pay the bribe and provision is public. Therefore the two regimes only differ in the interval
1
2rs2r1.
As stated in the next proposition, the ranking of the two regimes now is not independent on the value of d, the social
cost of the cost reducing effort.
Proposition 2. There exists a d 2 ðd,1Þ such that, for any dod we have WC4WG and for any d4d we have WCoWG:
Proof. We consider two cases.First case: dod. In this case WGðs2ÞoWPðs2Þ for any s2: Therefore WGoWPoWC , where the last inequality follows
from Proposition 1.Second case: dZd. Deﬁne s^2 as in the proof of Proposition 1. We know that s^2 is increasing in d and s^2 ¼ 12 when d¼ d:
If s^2r1 we write the difference WCWG as the sum of two elements:
WCWG ¼
Z s^2
1=2
½WPðs2ÞWG ds2þ
Z 1
s^2
½WPðs2ÞWG ds2:
Notice that the ﬁrst integral is negative and the second is positive and, by linearity of WPðs2Þ, the two
integrals are equal when s^2 ¼ 34.
If, instead, s^241 then WPðs2ÞoWG for any value of s2 2 ½0;1 and
WCWG ¼
Z 1
1=2
½WPðs2ÞWG ds2o0:
We conclude that WCWG is positive for 12 o s^o34, zero for s^ ¼ 34 and negative for s^434: The equation
s^ ¼ ðdþ3Þ=2ð1dÞð2þdÞ2 ¼ 34 determines the value of d ¼ 0:6542. &The conclusion of Proposition 2 for dod, i.e. when the social cost of effort is small, is straightforward: since in this case
public provision is worse than privatization, corruption is the overall preferred regime. For higher values of d, however,
things are more complex: when the social cost of effort raises above d, the positive selection effect of corruption is
increasingly offset by the fact that private provision is socially inefﬁcient and it is not clear which force is stronger. As it
turns out, for sufﬁciently high values of d, the second effect prevails and public provision becomes preferable to letting a
corrupt politician decide the provision regime.
The results of Propositions 1 and 2 are summarized in Fig. 2 where we compare expected welfare in the three regimes
as a function of d: In the ﬁgure, the black straight line is WP and the gray one is WC ; as stated in Proposition 1, the ﬁrst
always lies below the second. These two lines intersect the curve WG in d and d respectively.
W1
WC
WP
WG
Fig. 2. Expected social welfare comparison as a function of d.
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The model considered so far is very simple; its main advantage is to allow for easy-to-compute, closed form solutions of
the equilibrium expected social welfare functions under the different regimes. However, our result that corruption may
play a positive selection effect holds in much more general contexts.
Consider a situation where there is a trade-off between public and private provision: when the negative externality on
quality of the cost reducing effort is small, that is, for low values of d, private provision is more favorable; otherwise public
provision is better. When this is not the case, one of the two regimes is deﬁnitely superior and the choice of the regime
should not be left to a politician that would expose it to the risk of being based on corruption. In other words, we believe
that the question ‘‘who scores better between a corrupt politician and a benevolent one’’ is, in this context, of a more
practical interest when the politician has a role to play in evaluating the social costs and beneﬁts of the two regimes.
To prove that the private regime is always worse, in terms of social welfare, than corruption, we used three key
elements; in what follows we discuss them and we explain why they should hold in general.
The ﬁrst element is the fact that the bribing system selects the most efﬁcient private managers. This fact follows from
the assumption that the private manager’s proﬁt is increasing in s, the cost reducing efﬁciency. This assumption seems
natural in most reasonable representations of this problem.
The second element is that the comparison between social welfare under corruption and that obtainable with
privatization is monotonic in d, which measures the magnitude of the social cost of effort. In our model, this follows from
the fact that WG decreases with d at a slower speed than WPðsÞ does. Notice that both WG and WPðsÞ are decreasing in d;
this is so because under both regimes the cost reducing effort is positive and, therefore, all other things being equal, the
higher is d the lower is social welfare. However, they decrease at a different speed: in fact, the cost reducing effort is
decreasing in d under public provision, thanks to the fact that the latter regime partly internalizes the negative effect of
effort on quality and, thus, on social welfare. Under privatization, instead, effort is independent on d. Therefore the public
provision regime is better than the private one in internalizing the social cost of effort. This is likely to be a common
characteristic of this problem, holding outside of our special model.
The third and last element that plays a role in our proof is the fact that, for d¼ 0, the managers left out under
corruption, in other words those who do not pass the ﬁlter of the bribing system, produce, on average, a smaller expected
social welfare than the average public bureaucrat. It is hard to tell whether this condition holds in general, since it depends
(i) on the relative magnitude of WPðsÞ and WG, (ii) on the probability distribution of sG and sP , i.e. on the distribution of
the cost reducing efﬁciency in the public and private sector and, if the price of the facility PF is strictly positive, (iii) on how
large PF is. So it is this third fact that will likely decide, in a more general model, whether the result holds true.
65. Conclusion
We have focused on corruption in the privatization process and on its effect on social welfare when there is asymmetric
information on the public and private manager’s efﬁciencies. Our analysis reveals one of the mechanisms through which
corruption may be beneﬁcial: it can play a positive selection effect on the efﬁciency of the private ﬁrm. This is not to say
that Governments should not be worried about corruption or, worst, encourage it. In fact, there might be other forces at
play, that we have not included in our simple model, and whose consequences are not so desirable (see, for example,
Bjorvatn and Soreide, 2005). But, certainly, unveiling this mechanism could help reconcile some ambiguous empirical
results.6 More precisely, given the monotonicity in d, if for some d0 the expected value of the social welfare under privatization conditional on the set of
manager’s types not accepting to pay the bribe is smaller than the overall expected value of social welfare under public provision, then we expect social
welfare to be higher under corruption than under privatization, for any dZd0 .
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